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Abstract
Background: The integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR) strategy was adopted in Ghana over a
decade ago, yet gaps still remain in its proper functioning. The objective of this study was to assess the core and
support functions of the IDSR system at the periphery level of the health system in northern Ghana.
Methods: A qualitative study has been conducted among 18 key informants in two districts of Upper East Region. The
respondents were from 9 health facilities considered representative of the health system (public, private and mission).
A semi-structured questionnaire with focus on core and support functions (e.g. case detection, confirmation, reporting,
analysis, investigation, response, training, supervision and resources) of the IDSR system was administered to the
respondents. The responses were recorded according to specific themes.
Results: The majority (7/9) of health facilities had designated disease surveillance officers. Some informants were of the
opinion that the core and support functions of the IDSR system had improved over time. In particular, mobile phone
reporting was mentioned to have made IDSR report submission easier. However, none of the health facilities had
copies of the IDSR Technical Guidelines for standard case definitions, laboratories were ill-equipped, supervision was
largely absent and feedback occurred rather irregular. Informants also reported, that the community perceived
diagnostic testing at the health facilities to be unreliable (e.g. tuberculosis, Human Immunodeficiency Virus). In addition,
disease surveillance activities were of low priority for nurses, doctors, administrators and laboratory workers.
Conclusions: Although the IDSR system was associated with some benefits to the system such as reporting and
accessibility of surveillance reports, there remain major challenges to the functioning and the quality of IDSR in Ghana.
Disease surveillance needs to be much strengthened in West Africa to cope with outbreaks such as the recent Ebola
epidemic.
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Background
Surveillance is the ongoing systematic collection, ana-
lysis and interpretation of health data essential for plan-
ning, implementation, and evaluation of public health
practice, closely integrated with timely dissemination of
these data to those who need to know [1, 2]. In spite of
increased efforts in strengthening health systems, develop-
ing countries still have a long way to go to achieve well-
functioning health systems. In particular the International
Health Regulations (IHR 2005), which require Member
States to strengthen their existing capacity for disease sur-
veillance and response using the IDSR strategy, are still
not well implemented [3–5]. As a result, data of poor
quality are used for planning and decision-making in
many developing countries [6]. These problems are aggra-
vated by disease-specific programs continuing to imple-
ment separate surveillance systems which lead to a
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proliferation of indicators and overburdening of the health
workforce [7].
In the 1990s, a number of disease outbreaks (e.g. yel-
low fever, cholera, meningococcal meningitis and Ebola
and Marburg haemorrhagic fevers) occurred in Africa
due to emerging and re-emerging pathogens [4]. As a re-
sult, the World Health Organization Regional Office for
Africa (WHO-AFRO) and other partners were asked by
the various ministries of health to develop strategies that
would enable countries to respond adequately to these
challenges including detection and confirmation of dis-
eases in time and overall strengthening of surveillance
capacities [4]. In 1998, WHO-AFRO adopted the Inte-
grated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strat-
egy for its member countries as a comprehensive public
health strategy [5, 8–11]. The goal of the IDSR strategy
is to build member countries capacity to detect, report
and effectively respond to priority diseases as well as to
integrate multiple existing vertical surveillance systems,
and linking laboratory and other data sources for public
health action [9, 12-14]. The IDSR strategy particularly
focuses on the district level of the health systems [13].
Ghana has experienced severe outbreaks of cholera,
meningococcal meningitis and yellow fever in the years
1996/97 [15]. In 2002, Ghana adopted the IDSR strategy
and implemented it nationwide to improve the disease
surveillance system. The strategy has since seen a decade
of implementation and the number of diseases required
for reporting increased from 23 in 2002 to 43 in 2011
[16, 17]. This increase was due to several epidemio-
logical considerations including social, economic, and
environmental changes [16]. In addition, the increased
number of diseases reflects the added requirements of
the IHR (2005) [4]. With these requirements, weak
health systems with inadequate infrastructure may not
be effective in disease surveillance. Besides, the limited
human resources in the health system may further be
overburdened with data processing and reporting. Re-
cently, the District Health Information Management
System II (DHIMS2) was introduced as an internet-
based system for nationwide reporting. This requires
IDSR data to be reported through the DHIMS2 with the
overall goal of reducing the reporting burden in primary
health care settings and to improve data quality and reli-
ability [18]. The objective of this study was to assess the
core and support functions of the IDSR strategy at the
periphery level of the health systems in northern Ghana
(Fig. 1).
Ghana health care system
Ghana’s health care system is organized in a three tier
system (i.e. district, region and national). This is further
structured into five levels; national, regional, district,
sub-district and community. The smallest unit of the
health system is the Community-based Health Planning
and Services (CHPS), which is responsible for the
provision of community level health activities including
treatment of minor ailments, home-visits, community
outreaches, education and health promotion [19]. Pri-
mary Health Care (PHC) is delivered by the district
health system and entails all institutions including
CHPS, health centres, clinics and hospitals. The health
centre is mainly responsible for providing clinical, public
health and maternity services and uses a combination of
facility-based services, regular outreaches and mass cam-
paigns in close collaboration with communities, commu-
nity institutions, leaders and community-based health
workers. The district hospital serves as the first referral
point in the PHC system in the country [19, 20] where
clinical, surgical, laboratory and maternity services are
provided (Fig. 2).
Fig. 1 Key concepts of IDSR. Source: modified from conceptual framework of public health surveillance [14]
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The definition of periphery health system in this study
includes Community-Based Surveillance Volunteers
(CBSV), Community-based Health Planning and Service




Ghana is situated in West Africa and bordered by Ivory
Coast to the west, Burkina Faso to the north, Togo to
the east, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south (Fig. 3).
Administratively, the country is composed of 10 admin-
istrative regions and 216 districts. The Kassena-Nankana
districts (Kassena-Nankana Municipal and Kassena-
Nankana West) are situated in the Upper East Region
(UER) [21], one of the poorest regions in Ghana [22].
The districts are bordered by Burkina Faso to the north.
In 2012, the Kassena-Nankana districts had a population
of approximately 185,000 people [23]. The two major
ethnic groups are the Kassenas and the Nankanis [24].
The ecological characteristic of the study area is that
of Sahel with semi-arid Guinea savannah vegetation.
There is one rainy season each year from June to October.
The local economy depends on subsistence agriculture.
The major crops cultivated in the area are millet, maize,
sorghum and rice [21]. The majority of the people live in
rural settings and households are grouped into extended
family units or compounds [25]. The Kassena-Nankana
districts are served by one hospital, six health centres, one
private clinic and two mission clinics. Moreover, there are
several private chemists, drug vendors, traditional healers
and traditional birth attendants. Finally, the Navrongo
Health Research Centre (NHRC) is also situated in the
area, which has a good laboratory and runs a Health and
Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS) [21, 24, 26].
Malaria, gastroenteritis and acute respiratory infection
Fig. 2 Organization of the health system in Ghana. Source: adopted from Ghana health service [20]
Fig. 3 Location of Ghana in Africa, the Upper East Region and the Kassena-Nankana Districts. Source: Profile of the Navrongo Health and Demographic
Surveillance System [25]
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are the main causes of morbidity and mortality in the
study area, and outbreaks of meningitis also occur
periodically [21].
Surveillance procedures
At the community level, surveillance activities are
undertaken by local volunteers who are trained to ob-
serve and report diseases to the peripheral health facil-
ities using simple case definitions [16, 17]. For example,
a simple case definition of cholera for community sur-
veillance is any person aged five years or over with lots
of watery diarrhoea and sometimes vomiting profusely
as well, while in case of cholera outbreak, any person
who passes watery/loose stool is a suspected case [17].
Any person with fever and neck stiffness in the commu-
nity is considered a suspected case of meningitis [17].
These simplified case definitions aim to enhance early
detection of public health threats at the community level
and prompt response from the health facility level. At
the health facilities, the data are differentiated into out-
patient, in-patient, consulting room and laboratory regis-
ters and transferred into daily summary sheets by the
disease control officers. The data of the summary sheets
are then entered into the IDSR reporting forms and sent
to the District Health Directorate (DHD) as weekly,
monthly or quarterly reports. The IDSR reports are re-
ceived at the DHD by the district disease control officer
or health information officer who enters the data from
the paper-based forms into the DHIMS2 [16]. The infor-
mation includes suspected cases, laboratory confirmed
cases and deaths [20, 27]. Disease surveillance data ana-
lysis is required at all levels of the health system to
determine trends and appropriate interpretation for ef-
fective response [16, 17]. Routinely, graphical presenta-
tions of the analyzed data are posted on the notice
boards for public health education within the communi-
ties (Fig. 4).
Routine diagnostic procedures
The standard case definitions in the IDSR guidelines are
a set of criteria used to decide if a person has a particu-
lar disease or condition [16]. There are however, several
diseases with similar signs and symptoms. Thus, bio-
logical specimens are required to be collected, stored
and processed to achieve specific diagnoses (e.g. malaria)
[16]. For suspected diseases which a periphery health fa-
cility lacks the capacity to perform laboratory tests for
confirmation, specimens are sent to the district hospital
or the district health directorate for onward delivery at a
designated reference laboratory (e.g. tuberculosis, men-
ingitis). The specimens are transported from health facil-
ities using motor bikes or pick-up vehicles where
applicable. At the district level, the specimen is trans-
ported by means of pick-up vehicle or motorbike while
at the regional level specimens are transported mainly
through the commercial transport system to the refer-
ence laboratories (e.g. Tamale Public Health Laboratory).
At the periphery or district level, the disease surveillance
officer or laboratory focal person is responsible for send-
ing specimens to the reference laboratories. When speci-
mens are sent to the reference laboratories, information
on the name and address of the health facility as well as
the name and telephone number (and e-mail address if
available) of the focal person for surveillance are required
for communication [16]. The important referral laborator-
ies in the country are the Noguchi Memorial Institute for
Medical Research and the National Public Health Refer-
ence Laboratories in Accra (e.g. Polio, Ebola), and the la-
boratories of regional hospitals in Accra, Sekondi, Kumasi,
Fig. 4 Flow of IDSR data in Ghana. Source: Ghana IDSR technical guidelines [16]
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Koforidua, Sunyani, Tamale, Bolgatanga and Wa (e.g.
cholera).
Study design
A qualitative study design was applied to query key in-
formants who are responsible for health care delivery at
the periphery of the health system. Interviews were con-
ducted on the core and support functions of the system
using a semi-structured questionnaire.
Sampling procedure
The UER is one of the three northern regions of Ghana.
The region is remote from the national capital and has a
higher likelihood of infectious disease epidemics. The
Kassena-Nankana districts were selected for convenience
to investigate the surveillance practice in more details.
Within the two districts, we included in the study the
only referral hospital (War Memorial Hospital), all the
five health centres (Kologo, Navrongo, Kandiga, Paga &
Chiana health centres), the only two mission clinics (St.
Martin’s, Biu & Martyrs of Uganda, Sirigu) and the only
private clinic (St. Jude clinic).
At the health facility, the medical officer or medical/
physician assistant, public health nurse, disease control,
laboratory and health information officers were qualified
to participate in the study. The medical officer or med-
ical/physician assistants are responsible for generating
surveillance information using clinical diagnosis for sus-
pected cases. This information is recorded in the con-
sulting room register such as age, sex, and provisional
diagnosis. The suspected case is then referred to the la-
boratory for further investigation and confirmation.
After the samples from suspected cases have been tested
in the laboratory, the medical officer or medical assistant
updates the consulting room register with the informa-
tion of principal diagnosis and/or additional diagnosis.
On the other hand, the laboratory staff functions to con-
firm the provisional diagnosis as well as to provide infor-
mation on any additional diagnosis after samples of
suspected cases have been tested and determined ac-
cording to standard case definition. While the disease
control officer collates daily, the number of suspected
cases, confirmed cases and deaths using the consulting
room registers, laboratory registers and in-patient regis-
ters as sources of data. This information is submitted to
the district health directorate using the weekly and
monthly IDSR reporting forms. They also conduct case
and contact tracing in the communities especially for
epidemic prone diseases. The health information officer
is responsible for the weekly and monthly IDSR data
entry into DHIMS2. They are also responsible for ana-
lyzing the surveillance data and determining trends in
disease occurrence. The public health nurse is
responsible for health education and promotion cam-
paigns during immunizations and disease outbreaks.
Eligibility for key informant participation included: a)
working with the periphery health facility; b) familiarity
and active involvement in public health, disease surveil-
lance or health information activities; c) willingness to
participate in the study; and d) completion of written
consent. On the day of the field visit, the head of the
health facility selected any two of the above list of health
workers and the questionnaire was administered to
them. However, new employees (less than three months
at position) as well as respondents who demonstrated
inadequate knowledge and non-involvement in disease
surveillance activities at the health facility level were
excluded.
Study procedure and data collection
A total of 18 key informant interviews among health
workers from nine health facilities were conducted. Two
informants were interviewed per health facility using a
semi-structured questionnaire. The main issues ad-
dressed in the questionnaire were: a) background infor-
mation of key informants (e.g. job title/position, sex,
education, number of years of work); b) availability of
standard case definitions; c) core functions of the sur-
veillance system (e.g. case detection/identification and
registration, confirmation, reporting, analysis, feedback,
and preparedness and response); d) support functions of
the surveillance system such as training of health
workers, supervision and resources for effective func-
tioning and e) satisfaction with surveillance work. Exam-
ples of the specific questions which were asked included:
“What are the challenges associated with identifying and
recording of suspected disease cases for surveillance?”
“What problems has this health facility had with hand-
ling and transporting of laboratory specimens to the
next level for further investigation?” The informants
were selected among the following disciplines present on
the day of the field visit: head of health facility (medical/
physician assistant), public health nurse, and specific of-
ficers for disease surveillance, health information and la-
boratory. Three of the respondents were subsequently
replaced due to their insufficient knowledge on disease
surveillance. The fieldwork was conducted between July
and November 2013.
Data analysis
The data was read multiple times, then transcribed and
coded into the various themes of the core and support
functions of the IDSR system. Broadly, the themes
encompassed case detection and registration, case con-
firmation, data reporting, data analysis, epidemic re-
sponse, feedback, supervision, training and resources.
Adokiya et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:288 Page 5 of 11
Limitations of study design
The study was conducted among health workers, thus,
the fear of victimization from higher authority was likely
to affect their answers. Moreover, the study design was
limited in terms of determining trends and differences
between health facilities. In order to remove such fears,
the respondents were assured of anonymity and confi-
dentiality. The strength of the design included detail in-
formation about the characteristics and perceptions (e.g.
needs and desires) of the health workers regarding the
IDSR system. It also created flexibility for the respon-
dents to describe the IDSR system according to their
own experiences and expectations.
Ethical considerations
Individual written informed consent was obtained before
the interviews were conducted. Ethical approval for the
study was obtained from the Navrongo Health Research
Centre Institutional Review Board (NHRCIRB155) and
the Ethics Commission of the Heidelberg Medical Fac-
ulty (S-215/2013). Permission was also obtained from
the Ghana Health Service in the region. The interviews
were conducted in English by the first author.
Results
The majority of the informants interviewed were males
(12/18). Seven respondents were disease control officers,
four were physician/medical assistants, three were gen-
eral staff nurses, one was a community health nurse, one
a biomedical scientist, one a health information officer,
and one a nutrition officer. Over half (10/18) of the in-
formants indicated that they were working at the same
health facility for the past four or more years while 6/18
were working at this place for a period of one to three
years and the remaining 2/18 less than a year.
Overall functioning of the surveillance system
The informants had mixed views on the functioning of
the IDSR system. Only a few (3/18) respondents said
that the DHIMS2 implementation in 2012 contributed
to improved disease surveillance. Nearly all respondents
(17/18) reported that they were not satisfied with the
disease surveillance performance. Reasons included lack
of community member’s cooperation (e.g. delays in pres-
entation of patients at facilities, refusal of referral for
diagnostic procedures, low compliance with treatment),
and inadequate staff for surveillance.
“The community members do not cooperate with
health staff in disease surveillance investigation. For
example, tuberculosis cases do not comply with its
treatment when given to patients. HIV (Human
Immunodeficiency Virus) cases also refuse to go to
War Memorial Hospital whenever they are referred for
further laboratory test to confirm the diagnosis.”
Medical Assistant, Informant # 2
“There is inadequate staff for disease surveillance and
sometimes, suspected cases delay in the communities
before visiting a health facility for diagnosis and
treatment which affects early detection.” Disease
control, Informant # 7
Case detection and registration
None of the 9 health facilities had copies of the national
IDSR technical guidelines (2002 and 2011 editions)
which contained the standard case definitions for sur-
veillance. The majority (15/18) of the respondents
agreed that health facilities had problems concerning
suspected cases identification and recording. The main
problems included limited laboratory capacity, discrep-
ancies in laboratory diagnosis, perception of false results
(e.g. tuberculosis diagnosis), unstable power supply, and
poor recording of cases in the registers.
“The health facility does not have adequate reagents
for laboratory test and does not have the capacity to
perform lumbar puncture. Unstable power supply to
power the laboratory equipment affects case
identification.” Medical Assistant, Informant # 7
“The identification of the suspected cases is not a
major problem of the hospital, however, suspected
cases are poorly recorded in the registers. There is
often discrepancy between the recorded cases in
outpatient registers and laboratory registers of health
facility. For example, a suspected case may be
diagnosed to be measles on Monday and then, on
Tuesday, the records will be changed to rather reflect
meningitis which makes it difficult for classification,
recording, tallying and reporting to IDSR system.”
Disease Control, Informant # 9
“The capacity of the laboratory is limited and unable
to test most diseases or conditions. For example, the
tuberculosis results from the laboratory are usually
inaccurate. Suspected cases refused to return for
further investigations on potential diseases. Some
suspected cases are also difficult to confirm. For
example, Yaws is difficult to be confirmed from the
flipcharts.” General Staff Nurse, Informant #15
Case confirmation
All nine health facilities had the capacity to process stool
samples for further investigation. Most (8/9) health facil-
ities had the capacity to also process blood/serum for
case investigation. There were, however, a number of
challenges on further investigation and confirmation of
suspected cases. These included unwillingness of pa-
tients to provide specimens for diagnosis confirmation,
lack of transport and staff for bringing samples to the
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reference laboratories, limited capacity in laboratories
for blood/stool storage, poor quality of specimens, and
difficulties in tracing specimens at reference laboratories.
“We lack transport to send specimens to district or
regional hospitals for confirmation. Sometimes the
laboratory staff takes poor quality specimens from
suspected cases. One of our problems is that the
suspected cases are unwilling to provide specimens for
further investigation.” Medical Assistant, Informant #
12
“There is inadequate funding to transport specimens to
reference laboratories, inadequate staff and no
personnel responsible to travel with specimens to
reference laboratories in Tamale or Accra. Missing
personal details of specimen at the reference
laboratory creates difficulties in specimen tracing.”
Biomedical Scientist, Informant # 10
Data reporting
Mainly paper-based IDSR data was sent from the health
facilities to the DHD, but sometimes information was
also transmitted by mobile phone. Other challenges in-
cluded shortage of IDSR reporting forms, irregular
reporting, lack of regular access to consulting room reg-
isters, inadequate staff, overburdening of staff and inad-
equate funding.
“The monthly and weekly IDSR forms are available.
Whenever there are shortages, photocopies are made
at the district health administration to replace.
Sometimes, the internally generated funds are also
used to make the photocopies.” Medical Assistant,
Informant # 2
“The weekly and monthly IDSR reports are prepared
and sent regularly. Whenever we failed to submit the
reports on time, sub-district and district staff calls on
phone to remind us and demand that the reports be
submitted.” Physician Assistant, Informant # 3
“I don’t easily have access to the consulting room
registers to count and tally suspected cases. This
increases the waiting time and affects timely
submission of IDSR reports to the district health
administration.” Disease control, Informant # 18
“The staff responsible for IDSR activities is inadequate.
An assistant is needed to improve reporting of IDSR
data. The counting of the suspected cases from the
consulting room and laboratory registers is so huge
thereby overburdening the disease control officer.”
Disease control, Informant # 5
Data analysis
Half (9/18) of those interviewed indicated that disease
surveillance data was analyzed at the health facility level
while the remaining reported that the data was not ana-
lyzed. However, if analyzed, the data analysis was often
limited to the immediate notifiable diseases and to
immunization coverage. Several reasons were cited for
the failure to conduct comprehensive analysis of disease
surveillance data such as inadequate personnel, and lack
of recognition for surveillance activities.
“The disease surveillance data has been analyzed on
the immediate notifiable diseases and immunization
coverage. You can see the graphs posted on our notice
board in the yard. Sometimes, the graphs are quickly
removed and replaced by other posters. The removal of
the graphs has made me to stop performing analysis
on the immediate notifiable diseases.” Disease control,
Informant # 5
“The hospital does not recognize the disease control
unit. This demotivates me from doing analysis on
surveillance data. But we make analysis for the half-
year reports and review meetings at the district health
directorate.” Disease control, Informant # 9
“I am only acting as the disease control officer and I
do not have adequate knowledge on the IDSR
reporting and analysis of surveillance data.” Nutrition
officer, Informant # 17
Epidemic response
Nearly all (17/18) the informants indicated that when
epidemic prone diseases are suspected at the health fa-
cility level, there is some response such as specimen tak-
ing and reporting to the relevant authorities in the
health system for appropriate public health action.
“The immediate action we take includes the
involvement of the community members on the
suspected case such as polio, cholera and meningitis.
In addition, district health administration is
immediately notified of the suspected disease for
immediate response.” Disease control, Informant # 1
“The case-based form is completed for the suspected
case and the specimen is taken for investigation. The
district health administration is notified immediately
and the suspected case is also referred to the hospital
for investigations.” Disease control, Informant # 13
Surveillance feedback
Nearly all the respondents (17/18) reported that no real
feedback to the periphery level exists (e.g. written report
or bulletin). Apart from direct investigations by phone
in case of inconsistencies in the reports, feedback on dis-
ease surveillance to the health facilities only took place
during the monthly unit head meetings or during the bi-
annual or annual review meetings. In contrast, the
health facilities provided feedback to their communities
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during durbars (formal community meetings,) and dur-
ing health education talks at out-patient departments.
The durbars are planned according to community events
(e.g. annual festivals, launching of a new health centre,
handing over of a new borehole).
“The health facility receives disease surveillance
feedback during the half year or annual review
meetings. Normally, when the district or region sees
discrepancies with the data, then they give feedback
especially on delayed reporting. However, the staffs
responsible for the DHMIS2 network communicate
more often on the performance of the health facility to
clarify issues based on the discrepancies as seen in the
reports.” Disease control, Informant # 1
“Oral feedback is given to the medical assistant on
visits to the district health administration. Sometimes,
the district disease surveillance officer calls on phone
to clarify the IDSR data whenever discrepancies are
detected in their IDSR reports.” Medical Assistant,
Informant # 12
“Community durbars are the platforms where disease
surveillance feedback is provided to the community
members once or twice in a year per community (e.g.
malaria and nutrition project supported by UNICEF –
United Nations Children’s Fund).” Disease control,
Informant # 15
Surveillance supervision
The majority of the respondents (15/18) indicated that the
health facilities have been supervised by officials of the
district or regional health directorates. However, they
reported that such visits were irregular and also not pur-
posely for disease surveillance except during epidemics.
One particular informant was uncertain whether supervi-
sion ever occurred for the purpose of disease surveillance
in the absence of outbreaks. Community surveillance vol-
unteers were sometimes supervised by the staff of a periph-
eral health centre according to an existing plan.
“The health facility has been visited by district and
regional officials for supervision. We have a visitor’s
book where the supervisors write their names, name of
organization/unit and date of visit including the
signature. Many different units and departments come
together on supervision but they do not come
separately for disease surveillance.” Disease control,
Informant # 1
“I don’t know if there was supervisory visit by higher
officials for disease surveillance activities. I remember
that HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus/
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) team came
recently on supervisory visit to monitor such cases at
the hospital.” Biomedical scientist, Informant # 10
“The health facility has supervised the community-
based surveillance volunteers. There is a plan for visit-
ing the community-based surveillance volunteers and
the dates for the visits are known by the volunteers in
advance.” Disease control, Informant # 8
Surveillance training
Only a minority of the respondents (2/18) had university
degree qualification. Nearly all (8/9) of the health facil-
ities visited had a trained disease control officer. How-
ever, they continued to receive refresher training while
on the job. The beneficiaries of such disease surveillance
trainings have however failed to multiply the knowledge
in the health facilities by training other staff. Various
reasons were cited for this failure such as their own lack
of in-depth knowledge and an overall lack of interest
and recognition for disease surveillance.
“In 2009 and 2011, I was trained on disease
surveillance during my nursing course and I have also
been trained after school by Ghana Health Service.”
General staff nurse, Informant # 6
“Disease surveillance is considered a unit issue which
has no impact on the hospital performance. The
laboratory is not involved in disease surveillance. I
must be honest; we at the laboratory do not know the
alert and action thresholds for epidemic prone
diseases.” Biomedical scientist, Informant # 10
“We do not train other staff at the health facility
because they do not have interest in public health and
disease surveillance activities. Disease surveillance is
considered a boring task by the staff. It is perceived to
be distraction to the work of prescribers/clinicians
since they use the same consulting room registers for
their work too.” Disease control, Informant # 16
“We cannot train other staff because of inadequate
funds, lack of interest by nurses and refusal of staff to
be trained. For example, community health nurses
refused to be trained on surveillance. Unfortunately,
one of these same nurses is now in-charge of a health
facility and has to prepare both the weekly and
monthly IDSR reports alone.” Disease control,
Informant # 18
Surveillance resources
According to the respondents, resources for surveillance
were inadequate in terms of financial, human, infrastruc-
ture and material. Also transfer and turnover of the staff
had negative effects on the functioning of the IDSR
system.
“As you can see, the disease control unit does not have
a sitting place at the hospital to do surveillance
activities. We are only sharing the child and maternity
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ward at the hospital as disease control office. We have
no means of transport (i.e. no motor bike and no
vehicle). Although, there are many vehicles at the
hospital, not a single one is allocated for disease
surveillance purpose.” Disease control, Informant #9
“The health facility does not even have one single
phone to report disease surveillance information
except our personal mobile phones.” General staff
nurse, Informant # 15
Discussion
This study provides an overview of the quality of the core
and support functions of the Integrated Disease Surveil-
lance and Response (IDSR) system in northern Ghana.
The adoption and implementation of the IDSR strategy
over a decade ago has shown some improvements in
disease surveillance activities in several countries which
include a potentially more rapid dissemination of informa-
tion and the inclusion of new diseases such as non-
communicable diseases into the system [8, 9]. Results
from this study in Ghana show that the IDSR strategy has
contributed to increased surveillance report submission. It
has also partly contributed to enhance analysis of surveil-
lance data at the periphery health facilities. In addition,
the IDSR strategy enabled each health centre to have a
designated disease surveillance officer. However, the main
finding from this study is that despite the adoption of the
IDSR strategy, disease surveillance remains a neglected
area in Ghana. This is similar to findings from other Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) countries which reported very lim-
ited capacity for disease surveillance [9, 15, 28, 29].
Core functions
The study revealed weaknesses in case identification and
recording at the periphery of the Ghana health system,
which supports similar reports from other SSA countries
[9, 11, 30]. The consulting room registers for capturing
patient’s personal information are rather detailed, which
contributes to mistakes in data recording and to over-
burdening of staff. For instance, clinicians have three
diagnostic categories for each suspected case i.e.
provisional, principal and additional diagnosis. The like-
lihood not to put data into the principal and additional
diagnosis columns was frequently observed in this study.
The study also revealed difficulties in the confirmation
of clinically suspected cases due to transport and com-
pliance problems (e.g. HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis) in
addition to overall very limited laboratory capacity. The
reported unwillingness of patients to provide specimens
and their perception, that diagnostic testing at the per-
iphery laboratories is not reliable, likely further affects
the completeness of disease surveillance. Despite very
visible and well supported national disease-specific
programs (e.g. Tuberculosis and HIV), appropriate
implementation of all components remains a challenge
at the periphery of the health system. Thus, the possibil-
ity of missing outbreaks due to the obvious lack of confi-
dence of the population appears to be real. This is
evidenced in the recent outbreak of Ebola in West Af-
rica, where many of the cases were not identified or con-
firmed on time [31]. Better public information and
communication on surveillance aspects is urgently
needed for an appropriate community involvement.
It was repeatedly reported by the informants that
forms for IDSR were not available, which likely contrib-
utes to missing reports and incomplete data on specific
diseases. Moreover, it limits the ability of the district and
regional levels to adequately conduct data verification
and validation. To address this problem, health workers
sometimes have to use their personal funds or internally
generated funds to make photocopies. Similar findings
of unavailability of IDSR reporting forms and use of per-
sonal resources has been reported from other developing
countries [32]. However, the reported initiatives of the
health staff to solve these problems can be considered
positive.
Electronic reporting on District Health Information
Management System II (DHIMS2) and mobile phone
texting or phone calls are additional strategies adopted
by the health system to ensure that disease surveillance
data arrive at the district. Although periphery facilities
do not yet directly enter data into the DHIMS2 (with
the exception of the district hospital), the informants
were of the opinion that it has the potential to improve
timely submission and continuous access to reported
data. With the electronic system, IDSR data can in
principle continuously be monitored, verified and evalu-
ated by the supervisory units of the health system to
provide reliable and timely information for public health
action. This would also reduce the travel frequency be-
tween the health facilities and district health directorate
for IDSR reports submission. In addition, with the in-
built data analysis capability of DHIMS2, the health
facilities can in principle perform surveillance data ana-
lysis for comparison, early warning and rapid response.
This is in line with multiple reports from the developing
world that components of m-Health have a huge cap-
acity to improve the efficacy of health systems [30, 33].
The capacity for data analysis and interpretation has
been shown in this study to be rather limited at the per-
iphery of the Ghana health system. While the immediate
notifiable diseases as well as immunization coverage are
at least partly considered, no further detailed analysis
takes place, which has clear implications for potential
contact tracing. Thus, the utilization of surveillance data
for planning and decision-making at the periphery level
remains very low [8]. However, there is some evidence
for an increase in the utilization of surveillance data in
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recent years at Ghana district, regional and national
levels [9].
The peripheral health system remains the first level of
contact with the population for suspected cases and for
surveillance data production. However, feedback to per-
iphery facilities is still rare and irregular in most of SSA
except during epidemics [9, 11, 30]. Disease surveillance
feedback has been described as one of the most import-
ant activities for improving health workers capacities
and performance [28]. On the other hand, this study
shows that the Ghanaian health workers in the periphery
have successfully used community gatherings to dissem-
inate specific health information to the population.
Support functions
The findings from this study demonstrate that supervi-
sion for surveillance at the periphery of the Ghana
health system is rather poor and inadequate, which sup-
ports previous findings [8, 9]. Although there is some
improvement in the deployment of disease surveillance
officers and nurses to the periphery levels, the level of
training is frequently not adequate for effective and effi-
cient disease surveillance.
The respondents confirmed the existence of global
problems such as inadequate staff, inadequate funding,
frequent staff turnover and poorly equipped laboratories
seriously affecting disease surveillance activities, which
supports previous findings from Ghana [15]. Apart from
insufficient human resources, problems with funding
and material support are among the major factors con-
tributing to poor surveillance data quality [32].
The study has some limitations. Firstly, as the investi-
gations were limited to a small area in the North, find-
ings are not representative of the entire health system in
Ghana. Secondly, most of the information was self-
reported and is thus likely influenced by individual fac-
tors of the limited number of respondents.
Conclusion
In conclusion, although the IDSR system was associated
with some benefits to the health system such as tracing of
delayed reports and better availability and accessibility of
electronic reports, there remain major challenges to the
functioning and the quality of DHIMS2 in Ghana. As dis-
ease surveillance has obviously remained a neglected area
of health systems in SSA, increasing attention to and rec-
ognition of surveillance activities as essential for the over-
all functioning of the health system are urgently needed.
With the event of the dramatic and ongoing Ebola epi-
demic in West Africa, this becomes even more evident for
early detection and appropriate response to prevent out-
breaks and spread.
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